Thomas Crowther (Warwick) Objects, Selves and the Simple View

The simple view of the identity of the self over time is associated with the claims that self-identity is absolute or all-or-nothing, determinate, and also unanalysable, at least in any non-trivial or non-circular way. Philosophers who have adopted the simple view of the self have characteristically denied that any such simple view can be true of the identity over time of objects independent of us in the spatio-temporal environment. In this paper, I want to suggest that one who adopts the simple view of the self at least need not deny that the identity over time of objects around us is also simple in the relevant way. That will involve sketching a position from which various arguments that can be offered against the simplicity of ordinary objects can be resisted, but also having a better sense of what is fundamentally at issue in this question about simplicity.